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Abstract: The identification of aggregate human capital externalities is still not 
fully understood. The existing ( Mincerian) approach confounds positive 
externalities with wage changes due to a downward sloping demand curve for 
human capital. As a result, it yields positive externalities even when wages equal 
marginal social products. We propose an approach that identifies human capital 
externalities whether or not aggregate demand for human capital slopes 
downward. Another advantage of our approach is that it does not require 
estimates of the individual return to human capital. Applications to US cities and 
states between 1970 and 1990 yield no evidence of significant average-schooling 
externalities. 
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1      Introduction 
Depending on their strength, aggregate human capital externalities can help explain cross-
country differences in economic development, the lack of capital flows to poor countries, the 
effects of agglomeration on economic growth, and other macroeconomic phenomena (e.g. 
Lucas (1988, 1990), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Benabou (1996), Black and Henderson 
(1999)). Human capital externalities also determine to what extent human capital accumulation 
should be subsidized (e.g. Gemmell (1997), Heckman and Klenow (1998), Heckman (2000)). 
Assessing the strength of human capital externalities is therefore important for applied 
economic theory as well as economic policy, and empirical research has responded with a 
variety of different approaches and estimates (e.g. Rauch (1993), Rudd (2000), Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001), Conley, Flier, and Tsang (2003), Moretti (2004a, 2004b); see Moretti (2004c) 
for a survey). Existing work using wages achieves identification by assuming that all effects of 
the supply of human capital on individual wages are due to externalities. The strength of 
externalities can therefore be obtained as the effect of the aggregate supply of human capital on 
individual wages in an otherwise standard Mincerian wage regression (e.g. Rauch (1993), 
Rudd (2000), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Conley, Flier, and Tsang (2003), Moretti 
(2004a)). This is what we refer to as the Mincerian approach to the identification of aggregate 
human capital externalities. 
  In principle, wages may respond to the aggregate supply of human capital because of 
externalities or because of a downward sloping demand curve for human capital. For example, 
Fallon and Layard (1975), Katz and Murphy (1992), Angrist (1995), Johnson (1997), Topel 
(1997), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Card and Lemieux (2001), and Borjas (2003) show 
that changes in the education wage premium can be partly explained by supply driven 
movements along a downward sloping relative demand curve for more educated workers. We 
therefore analyze the identification of externalities in a framework where the demand for 
human capital falls as its cost rises. Following the empirical literature, the slope of the 
demand curve is linked to the substitutability between different levels of human capital in 
production. In this framework it can be shown that the Mincerian approach to the identification 
of human capital externalities yields positive externalities even when wages equal marginal 
social products. U sing estimates of the elasticity of substitution between more and less 
educated workers in the empirical literature, we find an upward bias of the Mincerian 
approach of between 60 and 70 percent of the individual return to schooling in a first-order 
approximation and somewhat larger in simulations. 
  We propose an alternative approach to the identification of human capital externalities. The 
theoretical basis is that, under general conditions, the strength of human capital externalities 
equals the average earnings-weighted effect of human capital on wages, which in turn equals 
the effect of human capital on the average wage when holding the labor-force skill- 
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composition constant. This result is easiest to explain in the case with two production factors 
only, S more educated workers and  1 US =-  less educated workers (total employment will be 
held constant and is normalized to unity). If more educated workers have a positive externality 
of strength  EXT on output  Y, their marginal social product  / YS ¶¶  exceeds the difference 
between the wage of a more and a less educated worker  SU ww -  by  EXT, 
( ) / SU YSEXTww ¶¶=+-. Our approach to identification can now be readily derived from the 
equality between output and labor income,  (1) US YwSwS =-+ . Differentiating both sides with 
respect to the supply of more educated workers implies 
( ) ( ) /()(1)// SUUS YSwwSwSSwS ¶¶=-+-¶¶+¶¶  where  / i wS ¶¶  denotes first-order effects of 
supply on wages. Combining this last expression for the marginal social product of more 
educated workers with  ( ) / SU YSEXTww ¶¶=+- yields the externality in function of the 
response of wages to the supply of more educated workers: 
( ) ( ) (1)// US EXTSwSSwS =-¶¶+¶¶ . Dividing both sides by  Y so that externalities are 
measured in percentage points of output and using  b  to denote the share of more educated 
workers in earnings  / S SwY b = , results in our key equation:  













,                (1) 
where upper bars denote values that are held constant. Externalities can therefore be identified 
as the earnings-weighted average percentage-change in wages (the first equality). Or, 
alternatively, they can be i dentified as the log-change in the average wage holding skill-
composition constant (the second equality).  This is what we refer to as the  constant-
composition approach to the identification of aggregate human capital externalities. We show 
that this approach is easily modified to account for higher-order effects of the supply of human 
capital on wages. 
  The approach to identification emerging from this theoretical argument can be used to 
estimate externalities at the city, region, or country level over any  time period in two steps. 
The first step requires obtaining wages  x w  and labor-force shares  x l  by skill type x in each 
city, region, or country at the beginning and the end of the relevant time period to calculate the 
log-change in the average wage holding skill-composition constant,  ( ) ( ) lnln xxxx lwlw - ￿￿ %  
where upper bars denote beginning-of-period values and tildes end-of-period values. The 
second step consists of regressing the log-change in constant-composition average wages on 
(exogenous) changes in the supply of human capital and other determinants of wages. If the 
change in the supply of human capital enters positively and significantly, this indicates 
positive externalities. Higher-order effects  of human-capital supply on wages can be dealt 
with by either including higher-order changes in supply among the regressors or by using an 
average of the beginning-of-period and end-of-period skill-composition to calculate the 
constant-composition log-wage change. 
  We show that ultimately the Mincerian approach identifies human capital externalities as 
the employment-weighted average percentage-change in wages in response to a greater supply  
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of human capital,  [ ]( ) [ ]( ) 1//// UUSS SwSwSwSw -¶¶+¶¶  in the example above. When the 
relative demand curve for more educated workers is downward sloping, this approach yields 
externalities even when wages equal marginal social products. To see this note that (1) 
implies that earnings-weighted wage changes must average to zero when wages equal marginal 
social products:  [ ]( ) [ ]( ) 01//// UUSS EXTwSwwSw bb ==-¶¶+¶¶ . T he slope of the relative 
demand curve for more educated workers is key in how wage changes average out. When the 
relative demand curve is flat, wages do not change in response to relative supply, and wage 
changes therefore average to zero trivially. But when  the relative demand curve for more 
educated workers is downward sloping, earnings-weighted wage changes average to zero 
because the strictly positive effect of a greater relative supply of more educated workers on 
wages of  less educated workers  ( ) //0 UU wSw ¶¶>  is offset by the strictly negative effect on 
wages of more educated workers  ( ) //0 SS wSw ¶¶< . Weighting these wage changes by 
employment, as in the Mincerian approach, instead of earnings amounts to putting more weight 
on the rising wage of less educated workers and less weight on the falling wage of more 
educated workers because less educated workers earn a lower wage than more educated 
workers. As a result, the Mincerian approach yields positive externalities when there are 
none.
1 
  Another advantage of the constant-composition approach to human capital externalities 
compared to the Mincerian approach is that it does not require estimating individual returns to 
human capital. The constant-composition approach can therefore be used even when 
instruments for individual schooling are unavailable. The Mincerian approach is implemented 
by estimating a Mincerian wage regression and therefore requires instruments for aggregate 
schooling as well as individual schooling (Acemoglu and Angrist (2001)). 
  Our discussion of the identification of human capital externalities when production requires 
many different, imperfectly substitutable levels of human capital is based on the aggregate 
human capital framework.2 We show that this framework yields a parsimonious way of 
capturing imperfect substitutability. An additional advantage is that it encompasses the 
Mincerian approach to externalities. The defining feature of the aggregate human capital 
framework is that the distribution of human capital affects wages only through average human 
capital. The approach to identification emerging from the human capital framework carries 
over with minimal variations to any framework where the distribution of skill types affects 
wages only through a single measure of supply (like, for example, the framework of Katz and 
Murphy (1992)).
3 Assuming that the supply of human capital can be summarized in a single 
measure is inevitable in empirical applications because of the difficulties in finding 
                                                               
1 The next section shows how to modify the Mincerian approach to ensure weighting by earnings. 
2 E.g. Lucas (1988), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Topel (1999), Bils and Klenow (2001), and Krueger and Lindahl (2001). 
3 We show this in Appendix A.6. The KM (pp. 67-69) framework does not encompass the Mincerian 
approach to human capital externalities however, which makes comparisons between the constant-
composition and the Mincerian approach less straightforward than in the human capital framework.  
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instruments for multiple measures of (endogenous) supply.
4 Using a theoretical framework 
where the use of a single supply measure is justified is therefore practical. It is not necessary 
for the theoretical validity of the constant-composition approach however, which we show can 
be used to identify human capital externalities even when the whole human capital distribution 
matters for wages. 
  Our main theoretical result in the aggregate human capital framework is that the elasticity of 
the average wage holding skill-composition constant with respect to average human capital is 
equal to the strength of average human capital externalities. This result holds whether or not 
the demand curve for human capital slopes downward. We also analyze second-order effects 
of average human capital on average wages holding skill-composition constant and prove that 
these are positive. Moreover, we show that the constant-composition approach can be used to 
identify human capital externalities even when externalities are biased towards workers with 
high or low levels of human capital. 
  As an application of the constant-composition approach, we assess the strength of average-
schooling externalities in US cities and US states between 1970 and 1990 using instrumental-
variable estimation methods to account for endogenous average schooling. Our results yield no 
evidence of statistically significant average-schooling externalities. Constant-composition 
point estimates of the external return to a one-year increase in average schooling are around 
zero at the city level and not much higher at the state level. Using the Mincerian approach to 
estimate average-schooling externalities over the same period yields a statistically significant 
external return around 8 percent at the city level and around 10 percent at the state level. 
Hence, Mincerian estimates of external returns to schooling are of a similar magnitude as 
private returns to schooling (e.g. Card (1999)) while constant-composition e stimates are 
relatively small and statistically insignificant. We show using calibration and simulations that 
this difference in results between the Mincerian and the constant-composition approach is 
consistent with the degree of imperfect substitutability between more and less educated 
workers found in the literature (e.g. Johnson (1997), Fallon and Layard (1975), Katz and 
Murphy (1992), and Ciccone and Peri (forthcoming)). 
  The variables used as instruments for city level changes in average schooling between 
1970 and 1990 are the demographic structure of the labor-force and population as well as the 
population share of African-Americans in 1970. These variables have predictive power for 
the change in average schooling at the city level because younger individuals entering the 
labor-force during this time period had higher levels of schooling than workers going into 
retirement and because African-Americans were catching up in schooling with the rest of the 
population. Our identifying hypothesis is that the v ariables used as instruments affect wage 
growth of white workers between 1970 and 1990 at the city level only through the supply of 
human capital. We check this hypothesis by testing the implied overidentifying restrictions and 
find it cannot be rejected a t standard significance levels. Our instruments for changes in 
average schooling at the state level are either the compulsory-schooling and child-labor law 
                                                               
4 Existing empirical studies use either average years of schooling of the share of workers with schooling 
above a certain level as a summary measure of the aggregate supply of human capital.  
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indicators of Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) or the same instruments used at the city level (the 
two sets of instruments yield basically identical estimates). 
    The Mincerian approach to human capital externalities was introduced by Rauch (1993) 
to estimate average-schooling externalities in a cross-section of US cities in 1980. Acemoglu 
and Angrist (1999, 2001) extend the approach to a panel of US states and account for state 
fixed effects as well as for the endogeneity of average and individual schooling. Their 
approach yields no evidence of significant schooling externalities between 1960 and 1980 (the 
period they focus on). Acemoglu and Angrist are also the first to show that human capital 
externalities as identified by the Mincerian approach subsume imperfect substitutability 
between skills (in Appendix A.2 of Acemoglu and Angrist (1999)). Another application of the 
Mincerian approach to human capital externalities at the US state level is Ruud (2000). 
Conley, Flier, and Tsang (2003) employ the Mincerian approach to estimate human capital 
externalities in Malaysian regions. Moretti (2004a) employs the Mincerian approach to 
estimate externalities associated with increases in the share of college-graduates in US cities 
between 1980 and 1990. Moretti also proposes an alternative to the Mincerian approach, 
which consists of testing whether a greater share of college-graduates in cities leads to an 
increase in their wages. He finds evidence that this was the case between 1980 and 1990. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 compares the 
constant-composition and Mincerian approach to the identification of human capital 
externalities in the simplest possible case. Section 3 derives the constant-composition 
approach in the aggregate human capital framework. Section 4 presents the estimating 
equations and explains the estimation methods. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 
discusses our empirical results and Section 7 summarizes. 
2    The Case of Two Skill Types 
Before turning to the framework with many different levels of human capital it is useful to 
elaborate on the differences between the constant-composition and Mincerian approach in the 
simplest possible case. We therefore return to the case with two production factors only, a 
number of more educated workers  S and a number of less educated workers  1 US =-, and 
also assume that production is subject to constant returns to scale. In this setting, a competitive 
equilibrium can be characterized by the following two conditions. First, that the cost-
minimizing demand of firms for more relative to less educated workers equals the relative 
supply of the two types of workers. Second, that full-employment output is equal to aggregate 
income [1][] US SwSw -+.  
  In this framework, the relative supply of more educated workers may affect wages because 
of externalities or because of a downward sloping relative demand curve for more educated 
workers (we will refer to wage changes due to downward sloping demand as neoclassical 
supply effects). If each one-point increase in the share of more educated workers has an 
external effect  EXTY q =  on output, (1) implies that the strength of the externality q  satisfies  
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,               (2) 
where  b  continues to denote the share of more educated workers in earnings and upper bars 
continue to denote values that are held constant. Hence, the strength of externalities can be 
identified either as the earnings weighted percentage-change in wages due to an increase in the 
supply of more educated workers or as the effect of an increase in the supply of more educated 
workers on the constant-composition log-wage. 
  A useful alternative perspective on the constant-composition approach can be obtained by 
subtracting the strength of the human capital externality  q  from both sides of the first equality 
in (2). This yields 















,               (3) 
where NCSP denotes neoclassical supply effects and [+] and [-] denote whether the effect is 
positive or negative.  ( )
[]
//0 UUU NCSPwSw q
+
=¶¶-‡ is the increase in the wage of less 
educated workers net of externalities and  ( )
[]
//0 SSS NCSPwSw q
-
=¶¶-£ the decrease in the 
wage of more educated workers net of externalities. Hence, the constant-composition 
approach exploits that neoclassical supply effects offset each other when weighted by 
earnings. 
  The Mincerian approach to human capital externalities obtains the strength of externalities 
q
M
 as the marginal effect o f human capital on the intercept of a Mincerian wage regression 
(e.g. Rauch (1993)). With two types of labor only, the Mincerian approach is based on the 
following model for wages: ln
M
ii wSabD q =++  where  i w  is the wage of worker i and  i D  
is 1 if the worker is of the high-education type and 0 otherwise (
M Sa q +  is the log-wage of 
less educated workers and b the education log-wage premium). Summing across individuals 
yields [1]ln[]ln
M
US SwSwSabS q -+=++  and hence 







.  (4) 
The Mincerian approach therefore identifies human capital externalities as the wedge between 
the marginal effect of the supply of more educated workers on the average log-wage (the first 
term) and the individual log-wage premium b (Acemoglu and Angrist (1999)). Differentiating 
















,  (5) 
which can be easily compared to the constant-composition approach in (2). (NCSP continues 
to denote neoclassical supply effects:  ( ) // iii NCSPwSwq =¶¶- .) The first equality makes  
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clear that the constant-composition and the Mincerian approach ultimately differ only in the 
weights applied to wage changes. The second equality shows that, unsurprisingly, both 
approaches yield a consistent estimate of the strength of externalities when there are no 
neoclassical supply effects,  0 i NCSP = . But in the presence of neoclassical supply effects, q
M
 
is strictly greater than the externality  q , 
[][]
[1][]0
S MU SNCSPSNCSP qq
+-
-=-+> . Hence, the 
Mincerian approach overstates human capital externalities. To see this notice that neoclassical 
supply effects on wages of less and more educated workers offset when weighted by earnings 
shares (see (3)) and that the employment share of less educated workers exceeds their earning 
share (because they earn a lower wage than more educated workers). The positive 
neoclassical supply effect on wages of less educated workers therefore more than offsets the 
negative effect on wages of more educated workers when weighted by  employment shares.
5 
The Mincerian approach therefore confounds positive externalities with neoclassical supply 
effects (wage changes due to a downward sloping demand curve for more relative to less 
educated workers). 
  There is another advantage of the constant-composition compared to the Mincerian 
approach to human capital externalities. The Mincerian approach is implemented by estimating 
a Mincerian wage regression and therefore requires instruments for aggregate and individual 
schooling (Acemoglu and Angrist (2001)). The constant-composition approach is implemented 
by regressing log-changes in the average wage holding composition constant over the relevant 
period,  ( ) ( ) ln[1][]ln[1][] USUS SwSwSwSw -+--+ %%  where upper bars denote beginning-of-
period values and tildes end-of-period values, on changes in schooling  SS - % . This only 
requires instruments for aggregate schooling, and the constant-composition approach can 
therefore be implemented even when instruments for individual schooling are unavailable. 
  It is straightforward to extend the constant-composition approach to account for higher-
order effects of the supply of more educated workers on wages. The simplest way is to include 
higher-order changes in the supply of more educated worker as regressors in the empirical 
analysis. An alternative is to use the constant-composition approach to put upper and lower 
bounds on the strength of externalities. The only additional assumption required is that 
production is subject to constant or decreasing returns to more educated workers net of 
externalities. In this case it can be shown that the following inequalities hold: 
( ) ( ) ln[1][]/ln[1][]/ USUS SwSwSSwSwS q D-+D‡‡D-+D %%  where  D denotes the difference 
                                                               
5 In this framework, there is a simple way to modify the Mincerian approach that results in a consistent 
estimate of the strength of aggregate human capital externalities. This change consists in weighting 
individual observations by earnings. The starting point of the earnings-weighted Mincerian approach is 
ln M
iiiiii wwwSwawbD q =++ . Summing across individuals and dividing by total earnings 
US UwSw +  yields earnings, where  b  continues to denote the earnings share of more educated 
workers. Differentiating with respect to the share of more educated workers  S, 
( ) ( ) (1)(/)/(/)//lnln M
UUSSSU wSwwSwSwwb qbbb =-¶¶+¶¶+¶¶-- . Using 
lnln SU bww =-  yields  (1)(/)/(/)/
M
UUSS wSwwSw qbb =-¶¶+¶¶ , which is identical to the 
constant-composition approach (see (2)). The constant-composition approach and the earnings-
weighted Mincerian approach are therefore equivalent.  
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between end-of-period values and beginning-of-period values.
6 Hence, the constant-
composition approach yields a lower bound on externalities when the (constant) skill-
composition used corresponds to the end of the period and an upper bound when the 
beginning-of-period skill-composition is used instead. Or, to put it differently, the constant-
composition approach yields the exact strength of externalities when the (constant) skill-
composition used is an appropriately weighted average of beginning-of-period and end-of-
period values:  






,                (6) 
for  * SSS ££ % . Hence, a third way to handle higher-order effects of t he supply of more 
educated workers on wages is to employ  an average of the beginning-of-period and end-of-
period skill-composition to calculate the constant-composition log-wage change. 
 
A       Quantifying the Bias of the Mincerian Approach 
The bias of the Mincerian approach to human capital externalities depends on the slope of the 
demand curve for more relative to less educated workers. There are several estimates of this 
slope in the literature and we now consider a framework that allows us to draw on these 
estimates to quantify the bias of the Mincerian approach. 
Calibrating the Bias of the Mincerian Approach 
Suppose there are no externalities and that firms produce output Y using a constant-elasticity-










,  (7) 
where U, S continue to denote the number of less and more educated workers, B captures skill-
biased technology, and  s  denotes the elasticity of substitution between more and less 
educated workers. In this case, the  bias of the Mincerian approach to human capital 
externalities is 
  1
Bias of Mincerian Approach SU ww
w s
- ￿￿ = ￿￿
Łł
.  (8) 
                                                               
6 If production is concave in more educated workers net externalities, the following two inequalities 
hold  ( ) ( ) ln[1][]ln[1][]() USUS SwSwSwSwS q -+‡-++D %%  and  ( ) ln[1][] US SwSw -+‡ %%  
( ) ln[1][]() US SwSwS q -+-D %% %% . Hence,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ln[1][]ln[1][] USUS SwSwSSwSw q D-+‡D‡D-+ %% . Note 
that production must be concave in more educated workers net externalities for a competitive 
equilibrium to exist.  
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Hence, for a given education wage premium the bias is decreasing in the elasticity of 
substitution between more and less educated workers. This is intuitive because higher values 
of s  imply a flatter relative demand curve for more educated workers and therefore a weaker 
response of wages to supply-driven movements along the demand curve. 
  What is the size of the bias of the Mincerian  approach for reasonable values for the 
elasticity of substitution between more and less educated workers and for reasonable values 
for the education wage premium? When we take more educated workers to be people with two 
or more years of college and less educated workers to be everybody else, the education 
premium  ()/ - HL www  averages to 40 percent in 1970 and 1990 for white males 40-49 (US 
Bureau of Census (1970, 1990)). (By focusing on white males 40-49 we sidestep the 
estimation of wage differentials associated with gender, race, and experience.) Almost all 
available estimates of the elasticity of substitution between college and high-school workers 
in the US point to values around 1.5 (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Ciccone and Peri 
(forthcoming)). Combined, these numbers imply that imperfect substitutability may add 27 
percent (0.4/1.5) to the Mincerian estimate of the external return to more educated workers. To 
facilitate the interpretation of this estimate, we make use of the fact that average schooling of 
white males 40-49 with two or more years of college exceeded average schooling of white 
males with less than two years of college in the same age group by 4.2 years in 1970 and 
1990. Hence, an increase in the share of more educated workers by 24 percent (1/4.2) amounts 
to a one-year increase in average schooling. Imperfect substitutability may therefore add 
around 6.5 percent (0.27*0.24) to the Mincerian estimate of the external return of a one-year 
increase in average schooling. 
Simulating the Bias of the Mincerian Approach 
The 6.5-percent estimate of the bias of the Mincerian approach to human capital externalities 
is based on small changes in the relative supply of more educated workers. This may not 
reflect the bias in actual applications. To get an alternative estimate of the bias we therefore 
apply the Mincerian approach to city-level wage data that is generated by combining the 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution production function  above with several features of the 
distribution of wages and human capital across US cities in 1970 and 1990. 
  The model underlying our simulations is built on the production function in (7). We 
continue to assume that there are no externalities and that the elasticity of substitution between 
more and less educated workers is  1.5 s = . Assuming competitive labor markets implies that 















￿￿ ￿￿ =+ ￿￿ ￿￿ - Łł ￿￿
Łł



















￿￿ - ￿￿ =+ ￿￿ ￿￿ Łł ￿￿
Łł
,  (10) 
where c, t are subscripts for city and year respectively. 
  Our simulations assume 163 cities, because this is the number of cities in our empirical 
application. The initial shares of more educated workers are chosen to match the share of 
workers with two or more years of college in each city in the 1970 US Census, which will be 
denoted by  1970 c S  (Section 5 contains a description of the Census data used). The initial levels 
of skill-biased technology, which will be denoted by  1970 c B , are chosen to match the level of 
skill-biased technology implicit in the data assuming that (9) and (10) hold. More precisely, 

















=+ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ -- - Łł Łł
.  (11) 
We will measure  ,1970 Sc w   ( ,1970 Uc w ) as the average wage of white male workers aged 40-49 
with 2 or more years of college (less than 2 years of college) in city c in 1970. 
  Starting from this calibration of the initial values for the relative supply of more educated 
workers and levels of skill-biased technology for each city we generate 163 city-specific 
human capital shocks,  c S D , and skill-biased technology shocks,  c B D . These shocks are drawn 
from identical and independent normal distributions. The standard deviation is chosen to 
match the standard deviation of  19901970 cc SS -  ( 1990 c S  is obtained analogously to  1970 c S ) and the 
mean is set to zero. The mean and standard deviation of the distribution for the skill-biased 
technology shock are chosen to match the mean and standard deviation of  19901970 cc BB -  (where 
1990 c B is obtained analogously to  1970 c B ). 
  We take a total of 5000 draws from the distribution for the shocks to human capital and 
skill-biased technology (a draw consists of 163 human capital shocks and 163 skill-biased 
technology shocks). Starting from the calibrated values for  1970 c S  and  1970 c B , each draw results 
in 163 values for  1990 c S  and  1990 c B , which substituted in (9) and (10) yield 163 values for 
,1990 Sc w  and  ,1990 Uc w . Combining this data on wages with relative supplies of more and less 
educated workers allows us to calculate the city-specific intercept of a Mincerian wage 
regression  1990 ln c a  for each draw as 
  ( ) 19901990,19901990,1990,1990,1990 lnln()(1)ln()(lnln) ccSccUcctScUc SwSwSww a =+--- ,  (12) 
where the double upper bar denotes the average across cities. Repeating this calculation using 
the 1970 values yields  1970 ln c a . The Mincerian approach identifies the strength of aggregate  
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human capital externalities as the effect of aggregate human capital on the intercept of a 
Mincerian wage regression. Hence, the estimating equation for the strength of human capital 
externalities using the Mincerian approach 
M q  is 
  19901970 lnlnconstant+
M
ccc S aaq -=D .  (13) 
Estimating this equation using least squares yields a point estimate  ˆ
d
M q  and a standard error 
ˆd
M r , where d denotes a specific draw for the 163 city-specific human capital shocks and skill-
biased technology shocks, for each of the 5000 draws. 
  The constant-composition estimate of the strength of the human capital externality is 
obtained in the following way. For each of the 5000 draws for city-specific human capital 
shocks and skill-biased technology shocks we calculate the log average wage in 1990 using 
the 1970 labor-force composition, 
  ( ) 19901970,19901970,1990 lnln(1)
F
ccSccUc wSwSw =+-   (14) 
and then estimate the equation 
  19901970 lnlnconstant
FCC
ccc wwS q -=+D ,  (15) 
using least squares. This yields a point estimate  ˆ
d
CC q  and a standard error  ˆd
CC r  for each of the 
5000 draws. 
  Table 1 summarizes the results of our simulations. Panel A contains the answer to the 
following question. Suppose we use the point estimate  ˆ
d
M q  and standard error  ˆd
M r  obtained 
with the Mincerian approach to test the hypothesis that the strength of human capital 
externalities is equal to zero against the alternative of positive externalities at some standard 
significance level (assuming asymptotic normality of the estimator). What fraction of the 5000 
draws would result in rejection of the null hypothesis? The entries in the lower right-hand cell 
of the table for example indicate that we would reject the hypothesis of no human capital 
externalities for 52 percent (75 percent) of the draws when tests are performed at the 5 -
percent (10-percent) significance level. Results in this particular cell are based on simulations 
assuming a standard deviation of the human capital shock ( () StdDevS D ) equal to 0.04 and a 
standard deviation of the skill-biased technology shock ( () StdDevA D ) equal to 0.08, which are 
the values implied by the calibration described above. Hence, the hypothesis of no human 
capital externalities is rejected far too frequently given the nominal size of the test and the fact 
that there are no human capital externalities in the model underlying the simulations. Other 
cells in the table contain analogous results for different values of  () StdDevS D  and  () StdDevA D . 
It can be seen that a reduction of  () StdDevA D  implies that the hypothesis of no externalities is 
rejected even more frequently and that the frequency of rejection reaches 100 percent when 
() StdDevA D  is equal to 0.  
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  Panel B of Table 1 answers exactly the same question for the constant-composition-
approach simulation results. That is, suppose we use the point estimate  ˆ
d
CC q  and standard error 
ˆd
CC r  obtained with the constant-composition approach to test the hypothesis that the strength of 
human capital externalities is equal to zero at some standard significance level (assuming 
asymptotic normality of the estimator). What is the frequency of rejection? The entries in the 
lower right hand corner of the table indicate that we would reject the hypothesis of no human 
capital externalities in 1.1 percent (4.8 percent) of the draws when tests are performed at the 
5-percent (10-percent) s ignificance level. Hence, compared to the Mincerian approach, the 
hypothesis of no human capital externalities is rejected far less frequently (rejection 
frequencies using the Mincerian approach were 47 times greater in the case of the 5-percent 
test and 16 times greater in the case of the 10-percent test). This is desirable as the underlying 
simulations assume that there are no human capital externalities. The results in Panel A and B 
are virtually unchanged when we increase the number of draws from 5000 to 10000. 
  Table 2 contains the average estimates of the strength of human capital externalities in our 
simulations using the Mincerian as well as constant-composition approach. The values in the 
table should be read as the simulated bias of the two different approaches as the model 
underlying the simulations assumes that there is no human capital externality. Panel A contains 
the bias of the Mincerian approach to human capital externalities.  The range of values is 
between 0.33 and 0.35, depending on the standard deviation of the human capital shock and the 
skill-biased technology shock. Hence, according to our simulations the Mincerian estimate of 
human capital externalities is biased upward. The size of the bias is somewhat greater than 
suggested by the calibrations based on first-order effects in the previous section (which were 
between 0.24 and 0.29). To facilitate the interpretation of the range of estimated values, we 
again make use of average schooling of white males aged 40-49 with two or more years of 
college exceeding average schooling of those with less than two years of college by 4.2 years 
in 1970 and 1990. Hence, an increase in the share of more educated workers by 24 percent 
amounts to a one-year increase in average schooling. The range of estimates obtained using the 
Mincerian approach therefore implies an upward bias of average-schooling-externality 
estimates between 8 and 8.4 percent. The numbers in square brackets below the estimate are 
the fraction of simulations yielding positive Mincerian  estimates of the strength of human 
capital externalities. 
  Panel B in Table 2 contains the simulated average bias of the constant-composition 
approach to human capital externalities. It can be seen that the bias is rather small (between -
0.003 and  -0.018). Using the same approach as in the Mincerian case to facilitate the 
interpretation of these values (that an increase in the share of more educated workers by 24 
percent amounts to a one-year increase in average schooling), the constant-composition 
estimates imply a bias of average-schooling-externality estimates between  -0.07 percent and -
0.4 percent. Hence, the bias is very small relative to the Mincerian bias (the absolute value of 
the Mincerian bias is between 11 and 24 times greater) and it does not imply any economically 
significant human capital externality. The numbers in square brackets below the estimates are  
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the fraction of simulations yielding positive constant-composition estimates of the strength of 
human capital externalities. 
  Summarizing, our simulations matching city-level data on wages and human capital most 
closely yield a Mincerian estimate of the city-level external return to a one-year increase in 
average schooling of around 8 percent, which is somewhat greater than the first-order bias. 
The constant-composition estimate of the external effect closely reflects the absence of a 
human capital externality in the model underlying our simulations. The simulations have also 
shown that an econometrician using the Mincerian approach to human capital externalities 
would reject the null hypothesis of no human capital externalities far too often in favor of 
positive externalities. 
 
3     The Human Capital Framework with Externalities 
We now turn to the identification of human capital externalities in the aggregate human capital 
framework. A key feature of this framework is that the supply of different levels of human 
capital affects individual wages only through average human capital. Another important feature 
is that the framework captures imperfect  substitutability among workers with many different 
levels of human capital in a parsimonious way.
7 
  Suppose that output  Y  of cities (or other spatial units) depends on the aggregate amount of 
labor  L and human capital  H  employed according to the following production function 
  (,) YAFLH = ,  (16) 
where A denotes the level of total factor productivity (TFP) in the city and 
  () ”￿
x
HxLx,  (17) 
where  () Lx is the number of workers with human capital  x in the city (using this notation the 
aggregate amount of labor in the city is  ()
x LLx ”￿ ). Assume also that the aggregate 
production function is twice continuously differentiable and subject to constant returns to scale 
to labor  () Lx for all  x (or, alternatively, subject to constant returns to scale to  L,H ) as well 
as constant or decreasing returns to human capital,  22(,)0 FLH £ . 
  Firms in each city produce according to (16) and maximize profits taking the city specific 
levels of TFP as given. Suppose also that product and labor markets are perfectly competitive 
and that output is tradable. Under these assumptions the equilibrium product wage of workers 
with human capital  x in a city with a supply of human capital relative to labor  / ” hHL  can 
be written as 
  (,)()() LH wxhAhAhx ww ”+   
                                                               
7 In Appendix A.7 we show that the constant-composition approach can be used to identify externalities 
even if the whole distribution of human capital matters for individual wages, there are no restrictions on 
the pattern of substitutability among different types of workers, and externalities are driven by the 
whole distribution of worker types. However, data requirements necessary to implement the constant-
composition approach are formidable in this case.  
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  where  (18) 
  12 ()(1,) and ()(1,) LH hFhhFh ww ”” ,   
The wage of workers with human capital x is therefore the sum of two components: the price 
of labor,  LL Aw w ” , (multiplied by the one unit supplied) and the price of human capital, 
HH Aw w ” , multiplied by the quantity of human capital supplied (x). A higher level of TFP 
translates into a higher price of labor and human capital. An increase in the relative supply of 
human capital  h raises the price of labor but lowers the price of human capital in the case of 
strictly decreasing returns to human capital,  22(,)0 < FLH , and leaves them unchanged if 
22(,)0 FLH = . 
  We will allow for the possibility that the marginal social product of workers with above-
average (below-average) human capital is greater (smaller) than their equilibrium wage. This 
is accomplished by assuming that TFP in each city may be increasing in the average level of 
human capital  h  in the city 
  Ah
q = ,  (19) 
where q  captures the strength of average human capital externalities. This setup yields  1 = A  
if  0 q = , which combined with (18) allows us to interpret  (,)()() LH xhhhx www ”+  as the 
wage of workers with human capital x in the absence of externalities, and  L w  and  H w  as the 
price of labor and human capital in the absence of human capital externalities. While our 
discussion of the identification of aggregate human capital externalities focuses on non-
pecuniary externalities, the same issues arise when externalities have a pecuniary origin as in 
Acemoglu (1996) for example. 
  Whether product wages of identical workers in different cities will be equalized or not 
depends on the motivations for inter-city migration. Identical workers in different cities will 
earn different product wages in equilibrium if cities differ in characteristics that are relevant 
for workers’ utility. Examples of such characteristics are the cost of housing, the quality of 
local public schools, local tax rates, the degree of air pollution, the crime rate, climate, and 
recreational opportunities. 
  The model presented so far is the simplest framework that allows us to discuss 
identification of human capital externalities when workers with many different levels of human 
capital may be imperfect substitutes. It can be extended in several dimensions without 
affecting our theoretical results on identification or our empirical approach. The most basic 
extension would include physical capital and land as factors of production and distinguish 
between tradable and non-tradable goods. Allowing for physical capital as a production factor 
does not alter our approach at all when physical capital moves to equalize its rate of return 
across cities. The main implication of extending the theoretical analysis to allow for land as a 
production factor is that our approach identifies externalities net of congestion effects. The 
main insight of allowing for non-tradable goods is that only externalities in the tradable goods 
sector are identified. All these extensions are discussed in the Appendix of Ciccone and Peri 
(2002). It may be worthwhile to point out that the model with land and physical capital has  
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many similarities with the theoretical work of Roback (1982). The constant-composition 
approach can also be used to identify human capital externalities at the aggregate level when 
physical capital is not perfectly mobile across the geographic units of analysis (the relevant 
case for human capital externalities at the country level), see Appendix A.3. 
Substitutability and Returns to Human Capital 
The framework described so far is flexible enough to allow workers with different levels of 
human capital to be perfect or imperfect substitutes in production. It is straightforward to show 
that assuming perfect substitutability is equivalent to assuming constant marginal returns to 
human capital given TFP,  22(1,)0 Fh = , or to assuming that the production function in (16) 
simplifies to  
  () YALBH =+  (20) 
where B determines the marginal rate of substitution between labor and human capital. In this 
case, wages of workers with a given level of human capital and the return to human capital 
will be independent of the average level of human capital in the city for a given level of TFP. 
Hence, all effects of the average level of human capital on the equilibrium wage curve must 
arise through TFP and can be interpreted as externalities. 
  Imperfect substitutability among different types of workers in production on the other hand 
is equivalent to decreasing marginal returns to human capital,  22(1,)0 Fh < . To see this suppose 
that the supply of workers with low human capital 
l x  in a city decreases while the supply of 
workers with high human capital 
h x   ()
hl xx >  increases so as to keep the total number of 
workers constant. It can be shown that the implied change in the relative wage of low human 
capital workers  ()/()
lh wxwx  is proportional to 
2
22(1,)()
hl Fhxx --  (this result is derived in 
Appendix A.4).
8 Hence, the decrease in the supply of low human capital workers and increase 
in the supply of high human capital workers will increase the relative wage of low human 
capital workers if and only if t here are decreasing returns to human capital. Moreover, the 
implied increase in the relative wage is smaller the closer 
l x  to 
h x . This is because the closer 
the levels of human capital of the two types of workers, the better they substitute for one 
another. 
A       Identifying Human Capital Externalities 
The constant-composition approach is based on the theoretical result that the elasticity of 
average wages holding labor-force skill-composition weights constant with respect to average 
human capital is equal to the strength of average human capital externalities. To state and 
proof this result it is useful to note that the average wage w can be written as 
                                                               
8 If there are only two types of labor, the production function in (16) implies that the elasticity of 
substitution between the two types is inversely proportional to 
2
22(1,)()







””˛ ￿ ,  (21) 
where  ()()/ lxLxL = . This notation emphasizes that the average wage depends on individual 
wages of workers with human capital  x  as well as labor-force skill-composition weights  () lx 
and that individual wages depend on average human capital in the city h.  
Proposition 1:  The elasticity of the average wage when labor-force skill-composition 
weights  () lx are held constant with respect to the average level of human capital yields the 










.  (22) 
Proof:  To proof this result it is useful to write the average wage in the absence of human 
capital externalities  (,)()






˛” ￿ .  (23) 



















where we have made use of (19). Hence, (22) follows if the elasticity of the average wage 
with respect to average human capital holding skill-composition weights constant is equal to 
zero when there are no human capital externalities. To see that this is the case suppose that the 
shares of workers with different human capital go from  { } (): ˛ lxxX  with an average level of 
human capital  () =￿x hxlx to  { } *(): ˛ lxxX  with an average level of human capital 
**() = ￿ x hxlx  (by definition  *()()1 xx lxlx == ￿￿ ). In this case the change in the average 





D”- ￿￿ . 
To prove that  ln(,():)/0 w ¶˛¶= hlxxXh we need to show that  /(*)0 D-ﬁ hh  as  *ﬁ hh . 






ŁłŁł ￿￿￿￿  
The first term in brackets is the change in the average wage that is implied by shares of 
workers with different human capital going from  { } (): ˛ lxxX  to  { } *(): ˛ lxxX . Constant  
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returns to scale and perfect competition imply that this term is equal to the change in average 






Łł ￿￿ . 
Making use of  (,*)(*)(*) LH xhhhx www ”+  and collecting terms, the second term in brackets 
can be rewritten as the price of human capital  (*) H h w  multiplied by the change in average 






















which implies that  2 /(*)(1,)() H hhFhh w D-ﬁ-  as  *ﬁ hh . Combined with  2 ()(1,) H hFh w ”  in 
(18) this proves that  ln(,():)/0 w ¶˛¶= hlxxXh.  Q.E.D. 
 
The proof of Proposition 1 and the intuition behind the result is closely related to the dual 
approach to TFP accounting. The main difference is that dual TFP accounting identifies the 
change in TFP associated with the passing of time while the constant-composition approach 
identifies the  change in TFP associated with an increase in the aggregate supply of human 
capital.9 
  Proposition 1 suggests that the strength of average-schooling externalities between t and T 
can be estimated in two steps. First obtain the average wage at time T in city c using wages at 
T but the labor-force composition at t,  ()()
t
cTcTct x wwxlx = ￿ . Second regress the log-change 
in wages holding labor-force skill-composition constant,  lnln
t
cTct ww - ,  on the increase in 
average schooling between t and T (and other variables that may affect wages).  
  So far we have concentrated on first-order effects of the average level of human capital on 
average wages holding labor-force skill-composition constant. It is straightforward to show 
                                                               
9 One way to see the relationship between dual TFP accounting and the constant-composition approach 
to human capital externalities is to derive the result in Proposition 1 in a way that is analogous to the 
derivation of the main result of dual TFP accounting. Note that  (,)()() LH wxhwhwhx =+  yields 
that the left-hand side of (22) is a weighted average of the effect of human capital on the price of labor 
ln()/ln LL dwhdhe =  and on the price of human capital  ln()/ln LH dwhdhe = , 
(1) LH bebe -+ , where  ()/() H whhwh b =  is the share of human capital in wages. Log-
differentiating  both sides of the equality between output and labor income  ()() LH ywhwhh =+  
yields  (1)(1) LH qbbebe +=-++  and hence (1) LH bebeq -+= .  
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that second-order effects are always positive. The intuition is easiest to explain in the case 
without human capital externalities (when the marginal social product of human capital is 
equal to the price of human capital). Suppose that returns to human capital are constant. In this 
case the marginal social product of human capital does not depend on the average level of 
human capital used in production. Hence, equality between the price and the marginal social 
product of human capital implies that the price of human capital is also equal to the intra-
marginal social product of human capital. Even a large increase in average human capital will 
therefore not result in an increase in average wages holding skill-composition constant. When 
the marginal social product of human capital is strictly decreasing in the average level of 
human capital however, the intra-marginal social product of human capital exceeds the 
marginal social product and the price of human capital. Hence, a large increase in average 
human capital will result in an increase in average wages holding labor-force skill-
composition constant. This result is proven in Appendix A.5. Empirically, higher-order effects 
of human capital on wages can be dealt with just like in the model with two skill types only. 
Either by including higher-order changes in human-capital supply among the regressors or by 
using an average of the beginning-of-period and end-of-period skill-composition to calculate 
the constant-composition log-wage change. 
B       Identifying Biased Human Capital Externalities 
Our analysis so far has maintained that human capital externalities enter production in a Hicks-
neutral way. We now turn to the case where human capital externalities at the aggregate level 
may be biased towards workers with high levels of human capital or workers with low levels 
of human capital. To do so we return to the aggregate human capital framework and replace 
the aggregate production function in (16) by 
  (,) LH YFALAH = ,  (24) 
where 
  q =
L
L Ah  and  q = H
H Ah ;  (25)
   
, LH qq capture externalities of average human capital at the city level (H and L are defined as 
in the baseline model,  ()
x HxLx ”￿  and  ()
x LLx ”￿ ). We also assume that the production 
function is twice continuously differentiable and subject to constant returns to scale given 
L A , H A  as well as constant or decreasing returns to human capital given  L A , H A , 
22(,)0 LH FALAH£ . The specification in (24) and (25) implies that human capital externalities 
affect relative wages of workers with different human capital if  LH qq „  and the elasticity of 
substitution between L and  H  is different from unity.  
  To determine the strength of aggregate human capital externalities implied by (24) and (25) 
suppose that average human capital increases by one percent. The resulting i ncrease in 
average labor productivity is  (1)(1) LH qbqb -++  where  b  is the share of human capital in 
the average wage,  / H whw b = . Of this total increase,  (1) LH qbqb -+  is due to human capital  
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externalities and will be referred to as the strength of aggregate human capital externalities at 
the aggregate level. The next proposition proves that the strength of aggregate human capital 
externalities can be identified with the constant-composition approach. 
Proposition 2:  Suppose that the aggregate production function is given by (24). Then the 
elasticity of the average wage holding labor-force skill-composition weights  () lx constant 
with respect to average human capital is equal to  (1) LH qbqb -+ . 
Proof:  The aggregate production function implies that the equilibrium wage schedule is given 
by  12 (,)(,)(,)
qqqqqq =+ LHLLH H wxhFhLhHhFhLhHhx . This equilibrium wage schedule implies 



















Constant returns to scale of the aggregate production function given  L A  and  H A  yields that the 
marginal product of human capital is homogenous of degree zero. The right-hand-side of the 
















































Homogeneity of degree zero of the marginal product of human capital combined with the 
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.   Q.E.D. 
While the constant-composition approach identifies the aggregate strength of human capital 
externalities, it cannot identify the parameters  L q and  H q  separately. 
4    Estimation 
We now turn to how the constant-composition and the Mincerian approach can be used to 
estimate average-schooling externalities.  
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A     The Constant-Composition Approach 
The first step is to eliminate gender, marital status, and race effects from the data on individual 
wages. This is done by estimating  
  loglog(,) ictctptiptict wseXv wl =++ ,  (26) 
where w  denotes the hourly wage;  ic  denotes individual i  in city  c; t stands for either 1970 
or 1990;  , se  are individual schooling and experience; X stands for dummies for gender, race, 
and marital status; and  v captures other factors determining wages.
10 The regression is set up 
so that the city-time specific intercept,  log(,) ct se w , corresponds to the log-wage of married 
white males. Gender, marital status, and race effects are allowed to differ across macro-
regions  p (the regions we use are South, East, Midwest, Mountain, and West). As an 
alternative approach we will estimate log(,) ct se w  using data on white males only, following 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). The method used to estimate (26) is least squares. 
  Once we have estimated city-time specific wages of workers with given levels of 
schooling and potential experience,  ˆ (,) ct se w , we can construct average wages necessary for 
implementation of the constant-composition approach. The average wage in 1970 is defined as 
 197019701970 ˆ ˆ (,)(,) ccc wselse w ”￿ , where  1970(,) c lse is the fraction of workers with individual 
schooling and potential experience  , se  in city  c in 1970. The average wage in 1990 using the 
1970 education-experience labor-force composition is 
1970
 199019901970 , ˆ ˆ (,)(,) ccc se wselse w ”￿ .  (27) 
  The strength of average-schooling externalities in cities between 1970 and 1990, 
CC a , 
can now be estimated by regressing the log-change of average constant-composition wages, 
19701970




 197090197090 ˆ logControls.
CC
ccc wSu a -- D=+D+   (28) 
By focusing on the determinants of average wage growth our approach eliminates city-specific 
fixed effects. The control variables considered are the log-change in city employment, to 
capture aggregate scale effects (e.g. Sveikauskas (1975), Moomaw (1981), and Henderson (1986), 
the change in average years of potential experience of workers in the city, and four dummies 
for the macro-regions described above. 
  Equation (28) will be estimated using two-stage least squares with the demographic 
structure and the share of African-Americans in 1970 (as well as various interaction effects) 
as instruments. 
B   The Mincerian Approach 
                                                               
10 Our estimates of the strength of average-schooling externalities do not change when we add controls 
for industry or occupation to the individual wage regressions.  
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The first step of the Mincerian approach consists of adding city-time specific fixed effects  ct a  
to an otherwise standard least-squares wage regression 
 
2 log ictcttictticttictptiptict wabscedeXv m =+++++ ,  (29) 
where  , se  are individual schooling and experience.  X continues to stand for dummies for 
gender, race, and marital status (gender, marital status, and race effects are again allowed to 
differ across macro-regions  p). The strength of average-schooling externalities in cities 
between 1970 and 1990, 
M a , is then obtained by regressing the growth of the estimated city-
time specific intercept,  19709019901970 ˆˆˆ ccc aaa - D=- , on the change in average schooling and other 
controls 
  197090197090 ˆ Controls
M
ccc aSu a -- D=+D+ .  (30) 
The methods of estimation, instruments, and control variables used to obtain the Mincerian 
estimate of average-schooling externalities are identical to those used to obtain the constant-
composition estimate. 
5    Data and Instruments 
Our constant-composition and Mincerian estimates of average-schooling externalities at the 
city level for the period 1970-1990 are based on data for approximately 2 million individuals 
in 163 cities in 1970 and 1990. The data comes from the public use micro samples (PUMS) of 
the US Census (US Bureau of Census (1970, 1990)). Individual wages are measured per hour 
worked. Experience is measured as potential experience (age minus years of schooling minus 
six). The control variables  X  included in the individual wage regressions are marital status, 
gender, and race (White; Black; Hispanic; Indian or Eskimo; Japanese, Chinese, or Filipino; 
and Pacific Islander or Hawaiian). To estimate (26) potential experience is partitioned in five 
intervals and schooling in six intervals, which yields a total of thirty schooling-experience 
combinations (listed in Appendix A.2). 
  Our definition of cities corresponds with some exceptions to the US Bureau of Census 
definition of standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) in 1990 and is explained in 
detail in Appendix A.2. City level employment in 1970 and 1990 is obtained by summing 
employment of all counties that were contained in the city in 1990. County-employment is the 
number of people with part-time or full-time jobs and comes from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (US Department of Commerce (1992)). We only consider employment in the 
private sector and exclude agriculture and mining. 
  Average years of schooling (experience) at the city level are obtained by aggregating 
years of schooling (potential experience) of workers in the city. Average schooling across 
cities rose by 1.12 years during the 20-year period 1970-1990. The standard deviation of the 
increase in average schooling was 0.56 and the maximal increase 2.1 years. Average potential 
experience across cities fell by 5.3 years.  
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  Table 3 contains the results of regressing the 1970-1990 increase in average schooling 
across cities on the 1970 instruments using the specification that fits the data best. The 
2 R  of 
the average schooling regression is 48 percent without macro-region dummies and 57 percent 
with macro-region dummies.11 The coefficient estimates of the average-schooling regressions 
in columns (1) and (2) combined with the sample values of the explanatory variables yield the 
following three main results (the non-linear specification implies that coefficient estimates 
must be combined with the sample values of the explanatory variables to assess the effect of 
changes in the explanatory variables on average schooling). First, cities with a larger share of 
workers older than 50 in 1970 (AGE50P70) experienced a greater increase in average 
schooling between 1970 and 1990. This is because workers who retired in this period had 
levels of education below the labor-force average. Second, cities with a larger number of 
people younger than 18 per adult in 1970 (YOUNG70) experienced a greater increase in 
average schooling between 1970 and 1990. This is because young people entering the labor 
force in this period had levels of education above the labor-force average. The quadratic 
specification implies that the marginal effect of YOUNG70 on the increase in average 
schooling was larger in cities with a larger number of people younger than 18 per adult in 
1970 (and also that the marginal effect would be negative for small values of YOUNG70; for 
sample values the effect is always positive however). When we add macro-region dummies in 
column (2), YOUNG70 and YOUNG70 squared are no longer individually significant but 
remain jointly significant at the 5-percent level. Third, cities with a larger population share of 
African-Americans in 1970 experienced a greater increase in average schooling between 1970 
and 1990. This is because African-Americans were catching up in schooling levels with the 
rest of the population over this time period. 
  Our constant-composition and Mincerian estimates of average-schooling externalities at 
the state level for the 1970-1990  period are based on data for white males aged 40-49 
collected by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), (the original data sources is US Bureau of Census 
(1970, 1990)). Following Acemoglu and Angrist we instrument for the change in average 
schooling at the state level between 1970 and 1990 using data on compulsory-schooling and 
child-labor laws. The basic information is summarized in eight dummies, CL6-CL9 and CA8-
CA11, associated with each individual in our sample. For example the dummy CL7 is equal to 
one, and all other child-labor law dummies are equal to zero, if the state where the individual 
is likely to have lived when aged 14 had child-labor laws imposing a minimum of 7 years of 
schooling. And the dummy CA8 is equal to one, and all other compulsory attendance  law 
dummies are equal to zero, if the state where the individual is likely to have lived when aged 
14 had compulsory attendance laws imposing a minimum of 8 years of schooling. The eight 
dummies are used to calculate the share of individuals for whom each of the CL6-CL9 and 
                                                               
11 The instruments (without macro-region dummies) explain 38 percent of the increase in the share of 
workers with a high school education or more, 31 percent of the increase in the share of workers with 
some college or more, 32 percent of the increase in the share of workers with a college education or 
more, 25 percent of the increase in the share of workers with a high school education only, and 37 
percent of the decrease in the share of high school dropouts.  
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CA8-CA11 dummies is equal to one in each state. Six out of these eight shares (we omit CL6 
and CA8 as both sets of variables add up to one) are used as instruments for the relative 
supply of more educated workers. The data does not include precise information on where 
individuals lived when aged 14, which is why we follow AA in assuming that at age 14 
individuals either all lived in the current state of residence (state-of-residence approach) or in 
the state where they were born (state-of-birth approach). Both the state-of-residence and the 
state-of-birth instruments predict more than 40 percent of the change in average schooling 
1970-1990 (not in table). As an alternative to the Acemoglu and Angrist instruments we also 
use the instruments of Table 3 at the state level. These instruments predict just above 50 
percent of the change in average schooling 1970-1990 at the state level (not in table). 
6  Results 
We first discuss the results using the constant-composition approach to average-schooling 
externalities and then compare the constant-composition results with those of the Mincerian 
approach. 
A   The Constant-Composition Approach 
Table 4 contains the results of estimating (28) at the city level using two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) with the instruments discussed in the previous section.
12 Column (1) uses the constant 
and four (of the five) macro-region dummies as controls. The estimate of the strength of 
average-schooling externalities is 0.014 with a standard error of 0.03 and hence highly 
insignificant. Column (2) eliminates the (individually and jointly) insignificant macro-region 
dummies SOUTH and WEST. The estimate of the strength of average-schooling externalities is 
now –0.004 with a standard error of 0.017. Column (3) uses the constant a nd four macro-
region dummies as well as the change in average potential experience 1970-1990 as controls. 
The estimate of the strength of average-schooling externalities does not change much compared 
to the specification without average experience in column (1). Changes in average potential 
experience have a significantly negative effect on average wages holding labor-force skill-
composition constant. Hence, cities where the average age of the labor force fell more than 
average saw an above-average increase of average wages holding labor-force skill-
composition constant, which suggests that these cities experienced an inflow of workers with 
high wages due to unobservable characteristics. The P -value of the test of overidentifying 
restrictions in the last row (0.53) indicates that these restrictions cannot be rejected at 
standard significance levels. Column (4) eliminates the (individually and jointly) insignificant 
macro-region dummies SOUTH and WEST. The estimate of average-schooling externalities is 
                                                               
12 Least-squares (LS) estimation of (28) is likely to yield biased estimates because the increase in 
average schooling is endogenous and measured with error. Still, in practice LS estimates of the strength 
of average-schooling externalities are very similar to 2SLS estimates (the difference is at most half a 
percentage point) and highly insignificant. For example, the LS estimate of the average-schooling 
coefficient in the specification of column (1) of Table 4 is 0.011 with a standard error of 0.026. This 
suggests that the different biases present in least-squares estimation tend to offset each other in this 
particular application.  
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now  –0.01 with a standard error of 0.018. The P -value of the test of overidentifying 
restrictions in the last row (0.41) indicates that these restrictions cannot be rejected at 
standard significance levels. Re-estimating the specifications in columns (1) to (4) f or full-
time workers only yields slightly larger average-schooling externalities, although the 
difference never exceeds half a percentage point. Columns (5) to (10) estimate equation (28) 
using selected instruments as additional control variables. The direct effect of the instruments 
on average wages holding labor-force skill-composition constant is in all cases small and 
statistically insignificant. For example, when adding the population share of African-
Americans in 1970 as a control variable in column (7), we find that a 5 percentage points 
increase in this share lowers average wages holding labor-force skill-composition constant by 
only 0.2 percent (the maximum variation in the share of African-Americans across cities in 
1970 is 25 percentage points) and that this effect is highly insignificant. Moreover, estimates 
of the strength of average-schooling externalities in columns (5) to (10) remain close to zero 
and insignificant. 
  Table 5 contains the results of estimating (28) using data on white males only to construct 
constant-composition average wages using (26) and (27). The method of estimation is 2SLS 
with the usual instruments. The results are very similar to those obtained using all workers 
once the (individually and jointly) insignificant macro-region dummies SOUTH and WEST are 
eliminated. For example the strength of average-schooling externalities in column (2) is  –
0.001 with a standard error of 0.021. The P-value of the test of overidentifying restrictions in 
the last row (0.73) indicates that these restrictions cannot be rejected at standard significance 
levels. Estimating (28) using data on white males aged 40-49 only to construct constant-
composition average wages in (27) also yields results that are similar to those obtained with 
all workers (not in the table). 
  Estimates of the strength of aggregate scale effects in Tables 2 and 3 are very imprecise 
and larger than the 4 to 10 percent reported in the literature (e.g. Henderson (1986), Ciccone 
and Hall (1996)). To see whether our results are sensitive to the strength of aggregate scale 
effects we estimate (28) restricting aggregate scale effects to values between 4 and 10 percent. 
The results are reported in Table 6. Estimates of the strength of average-schooling 
externalities are in all cases close to the values obtained earlier. 
  Table 7 contains constant-composition-approach estimates of average-schooling 
externalities between 1970 and 1990 at the US state level. The method of estimation is 2SLS 
using either the instruments of Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) or our instruments at the state 
level. Column (1) contains the result of estimating 
1970
 197090197090 ˆ logConstant
CC
statestate wS a -- D=+D , 
where state level constant-composition average wages are constructed using data on white 
males aged 40-49 only, with the Acemoglu and Angrist state-of-residence instruments (like 
them, we do not include the change in log-employment or other control variables in the 
estimating equation). Using the state-of-birth instruments instead yields very similar results. 
Column (2) contains the result of estimating the same equation using 2SLS with our instruments 
at the state level. It can be seen that estimates of the strength of average-schooling externalities 
obtained with both sets of instruments are nearly identical. Constant-composition estimates of  
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average schooling externalities between 1960 and 1980, obtained using the same methods and 
procedures as described above, are reported in column (3) and (4) and are very similar to 
those obtained for the 1970-1990 period. 
  Re-estimating all specifications using the 1990 education-experience labor-force 
composition to calculate the log-change in the constant-composition wage yields estimates of 
average-schooling externalities that are within one percentage point of the results using the 
1970 composition. Higher-order effects of average schooling on wages do therefore not 
appear to play an important role in these applications. 
B  The Mincerian Approach 
Table 8 contains estimates of average-schooling externalities at the city level for the period 
1970-1990 using the Mincerian approach in (30). The control variables, estimation method, 
and instruments are the same ones used for the constant-composition approach. Columns (1) 
and (2) contain the results when the underlying Mincerian wage regression in (29) is estimated 
using all workers. The external effect on productivity of an additional year of average 
schooling is around 8 percent and statistically significant at the 5-percent level. Columns (1) 
and (2) differ in that the latter eliminates the (individually and jointly) insignificant SOUTH 
and WEST macro-region dummies.
13 Column (3) contains the average-schooling-externality 
estimate when the Mincerian intercept is estimated using data on white males only. Results are 
very similar to the case where all workers are used. The P-value of the test of overidentifying 
restrictions in the last row of columns (1) to (3) indicates that these restrictions cannot be 
rejected at standard significance levels. Estimating the Mincerian intercept with data on white 
males aged 40-49 only does not change the results significantly (not in the table). 
  Estimating average-schooling externalities at the state level for the period 1970-1990 
using the Mincerian approach also yields statistically significant externalities whether we use 
our instruments or the Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) state schooling law instruments. Using our 
instruments, the estimates external effect on productivity of an additional year of average 
schooling is 10.2 percent with a standard error of 3.6 percent (statistically significant at the 5-
percent level). Using the Acemoglu and Angrist instruments yields average-schooling 
externalities of 9.8 percent with a standard error of 3.8 percent (also statistically significant at 
the 5-percent level). 
  When we apply  the Mincerian approach at the state level to the 1960-1980 period, we 
find average-schooling externalities of around 2 percent whether we use our instruments or the 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) state schooling law instruments. Hence, the Mincerian approach 
yields different results for the 1970-1990 period than for the 1960-1980 period. Simulation 
results of Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) show that this difference can be partly explained by 
the US Census recording individual schooling as a categorical variable starting with the 1990 
Census. They show that this change in measurement can explain a spurious average-schooling 
                                                               
13 The LS estimate of average-schooling externalities in the specification of column (1) of Table 8 is 
0.092 with a standard error of 0.029. LS estimates of average-schooling externalities in columns (2) and 
(3) are 0.076 and 0.082 respectively.  
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externality of 1.7-2.1 percent. This leaves about three quarters of the difference between the 
Mincerian schooling-externality estimates for the 1960-1980 and 1970-1990 period 
unexplained. 
7    Conclusions 
Wages may respond to the aggregate supply of human capital because of a downward sloping 
demand curve for human capital. The existing ( Mincerian) approach to human capital 
externalities confounds such wage changes with externalities. As a result, it yields positive 
human capital externalities when wages equal marginal social products. Using estimates of the 
elasticity of substitution between more and less educated workers in the empirical literature, 
we find that the upward bias of the Mincerian approach is between 60 and 70 percent of the 
individual return to schooling in a first-order approximation and somewhat larger in 
simulations.  
  We propose an alternative approach to the identification of human capital externalities that 
yields consistent estimates whether or not the demand curve for human capital is downward 
sloping. The theoretical basis is that, under general conditions, the strength of human capital 
externalities equals the effect of human capital on the average wage when holding the labor-
force skill-composition constant. Another advantage of our (constant-composition) approach 
compared to the Mincerian approach is that it does not require estimating individual returns to 
human capital and can therefore be used to estimate average-schooling externalities even when 
instruments for individual schooling are unavailable. 
  The approach to identification emerging from this theoretical argument can be used to 
estimate externalities at the city, region, or country level over any time period in two steps. 
The first step requires obtaining wages  x w  and labor-force shares  x l  by skill type x in each 
city, region, or country at the beginning and the end of the relevant time period to calculate the 
log-change in the average wage holding skill-composition constant,  ( ) ( ) lnln xxxx lwlw - ￿￿ %  
where upper bars denote beginning-of-period values and tildes end-of-period values. The 
second step consists of regressing the log-change in constant-composition average wages on 
(exogenous) changes in the supply of human capital and other determinants of wages. If the 
change in the supply of human capital enters positively and significantly, this indicates 
positive externalities. Higher-order effects of human-capital supply on wages can be dealt 
with by either including higher-order changes in supply among the regressors or by using an 
average of the beginning-of-period and end-of-period skill-composition to calculate  the 
constant-composition log-wage change. 
  As an application of the constant-composition approach we assess the strength of average-
schooling externalities in US cities and states between 1970 and 1990 using instrumental-
variable estimation methods to account for endogenous average schooling. Our empirical 
results yield no evidence of statistically significant average-schooling externalities at the city 
level or the state level. Point estimates of the external return to a one-year increase in average 
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Appendix 
A.1  Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Rejection frequencies of the null of no human capital externalities in a 
simulated model without human capital externalities 
 
Panel A: Mincerian approach 
Notes:  The reported values are the percentages of draws in which an econometrician rejects the null of 
no externalities against an alternative of positive externalities at the 5% or 10% confidence level 
respectively using the Mincerian approach. Each test is based on the t -statistic for the parameter 
M
d q estimated as explained in Section 2. The percentages are based on 5000 random draws of  city-
specific human capital shocks and skill-biased technology shocks. 
 
 
Panel B: Constant-composition approach  
 
Notes:  The reported values are the percentages of draws in which an econometrician rejects the 
null of no externalities against an alternative of positive externalities at the 5% or 10% confidence 
level respectively using the constant-composition approach. Each test is based on the t-statistic for 
the parameter 
CC
d q estimated as explained in Section 2. The percentages are based on 5000 random 
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Table 2: Average estimates of human capital externalities in a simulated model 
without human capital externalities 
 
 
Panel A: Mincerian approach 
 
Notes: The reported values in each cell are the average value of  ˆM
d q  (estimated using (13)) and the 
fraction of values larger than zero based on 5000 random draws of city-specific human capital 




Panel B: Constant-composition approach 
 
Notes: The reported values in each cell are the average value of  ˆCC
d q  (estimated using (15)) and the 
fraction of values larger than zero based on 5000 random draws of city-specific human capital 
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Table 3: Quality of the 1970 instruments for the change in average schooling 




Notes: Results of regressing the increase in average years of schooling and 
average years of potential experience 1970-1990 at the city level on a constant 
and the variables in the leftmost column using least squares with robust 
standard errors. The number of observations is 163. YOUNG70 and 
YOUNG70 squared are always jointly significant at the 5-percent level. * and 
** denote estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 10 and 5-
percent level. The quadratic specification for YOUNG70 implies that the 
marginal effect of YOUNG70 on the increase in average schooling (average 
experience) would be negative (positive) for small values of YOUNG70; for 
sample values the effect is always positive (negative) however. 
 
  Change in average 
schooling  
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MIDWEST    -0.17** 
(0.06) 
MOUNTAIN    -0.29** 
(0.14) 
WEST    -0.47** 
(0.07) 
SOUTH    -0.14** 
(0.07) 
2 R   0.48  0.57   32
Table 4: Average-schooling externalities at the city level: constant-composition approach 1970-1990 
All workers   
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Change in average schooling  





















Change in average experience 1970-1990 
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SOUTH  -0.03 
(0.02) 
  -0.036 
(0.026) 
             
WEST  -0.027 
(0.03) 
  -0.032 
(0.033) 
             
YOUNG70*AA70          -0.06 
(0.1) 
        -0.35 
(0.4) 
YOUNG70            -0.022 
(0.036) 
       
AA70              -0.04 
(0.09) 
    0.28 
(0.33) 
AGE50P*AA70                -0.004 
(0.34) 
   
AGE50P                  0.13 
(0.37) 
 
P-Value overidentifying restrictions      0.53  0.41             
Notes: 2SLS estimation with robust standard errors of (28) at the city level. All regressions contain a constant. Constant-composition average wages 
constructed with data on all workers. Right-hand-side variables used are those in the leftmost column. Instruments used are: people in the city younger than 
18 per adult in 1970 (YOUNG70), the share of the city labor force older than 50 in 1970 (50PLUS70), the share of African-Americans in the city-
population in 1970 (AA70), YOUNG70*YOUNG70, YOUNG70*AA70, YOUNG70*50PLUS70, and four macro-region dummies. * and ** denote 
estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 10 and 5-percent level    33




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Change in average schooling  











Change in average experience 
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SOUTH  -0.018 
(0.028) 
       
WEST  0.026 
(0.052) 
       
YOUNG70*AA70           
YOUNG70          -0.005 
(0.05) 
AA70      -0.055 
(0.14) 
   
AGE50P*AA70           





0.87  0.73       
Notes: 2SLS estimation with robust standard errors of (28) at the city level. All regressions contain a constant. Constant-composition average 
wages constructed with data on white males only. Right-hand-side variables used are those in the leftmost column. Instruments used are: people 
in the city younger than 18 per adult in 1970 (YOUNG70), the share of the city labor force older than 50 in 1970 (50PLUS70), the share of 
African-Americans in the city-population in 1970 (AA70), YOUNG70*YOUNG70, YOUNG70*AA70, YOUNG70*50PLUS70, and four 
macro-region dummies. The number of observations is 163. * and ** denote estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 10 and 5-
percent level.   34
 Table 6: Average-schooling externalities: constant-composition approach 
1970-1990 with restricted scale effects  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ˆ a    ˆ a   ˆ a  

























Notes: Method of estimation is 2SLS with robust standard errors. Estimated parameter is the 
strength of average-schooling externalities at the city level using (28) and restricting the 
strength of aggregate scale effects d  to the values in the leftmost column. Instruments used 
are: people in the city younger than 18 per adult in 1970 (YOUNG70), the share of the city-
labor force older than 50 in 1970 (50PLUS70), the share of African-Americans in the city-
population in 1970 (AA70), YOUNG70*YOUNG70, YOUNG70*AA70, 
YOUNG70*50PLUS70, and four macro-region dummies. The number of observations is 
163. * and ** denote estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 10 and 
5-percent level. The control variables used are: 
• Column (1): a constant and four macro-region dummies. The P-value of the hypothesis that 
the macro-region dummies SOUTH and WEST can be excluded from the estimating 
equation is 0.43. 
• Column (2): same as in (5) plus the increase in average experience. The P-value of the 
hypothesis that the macro-region dummies SOUTH and WEST can be excluded from the 
estimating equation is 0.57. 
• Column (3): a constant and two macro-region dummies (MOUNTAIN, MIDWEST) plus 
increase in average experience. The P-values of the test of overidentifying restrictions (not 
in the table) indicate that these restrictions cannot be rejected at standard significance levels 
for the values of d  in the table. 
 
Table 7: Average-schooling externalities at the state level: constant-composition 
approach 1970-1990 (and 1960-80) 
1970-1990  1960-1980   
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Change in average schooling at 











0.86  0.66  0.75  0.69 
Comments  AAIV  OURIV  AAIV  OURIV 
 
Notes: 2SLS estimation at the US state level of   s ˆ logConstant
F
s wS a D=+D  for 1970-1990 
and 1960-1980, where state level constant-composition average wages are constructed using 
white males aged 40-49 only. AAIV refers to the instruments used by Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2001) and OURIV refers to our instruments used at the state level. The number of 
observations is 49. See the main text for additional explanations.   35
Table 8: Average-schooling externalities: Mincerian approach 1970-1990 
All workers  White 
males 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Change in average schooling  































SOUTH  -0.047 
(0.035) 
   
WEST  -0.047 
(0.036) 
   
P-Value overidentifying restrictions  0.64  0.21  0.23 
Notes: 2SLS estimation with robust standard errors of (30) at the city level. All regressions contain a 
constant. Mincerian intercepts are estimated using data on all workers in columns (1) and (2) and 
white males only in column (3). Right-hand-side variables used are those in the leftmost column. 
Instruments used are: people in the city younger than 18 per adult in 1970 (YOUNG70), the share of 
the city labor force older than 50 in 1970 (50PLUS70), the share of African-Americans in the city-
population in 1970 (AA70), YOUNG70*YOUNG70, YOUNG70*AA70, YOUNG70*50PLUS70, 
and four macro-region dummies. The number of observations is 163. * and ** denote estimates that 
are significantly different from zero at the 10 and 5-percent level.    36
A.2    Data and Some Statistics 
The data used in the empirical analysis comes from the “Census of Population and Housing” 
Public-Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) files. For 1970 we have used the 5-percent sample 
modifying the extraction code kindly provided by David Card. The geographic identifier used 
for 1970 is the “County Group Code”. For 1980 and 1990 we have used the “Card and Chay” 
extracts of the 5 -percent PUMS (available at ftp://elsa.berkeley.edu/pub/census/), which 
include the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) code as a geographic identifier. 
Construction of Cities 
The definition of cities that we use corresponds, with some exceptions, to the US Bureau of 
Census definition of SMSAs in 1990. The PUMS of the 1980 and 1990 US Census have (FIPS) 
codes identifying the SMSA where individuals live. With this information we can assign 
individuals in 1980 and 1990 to one of 236 cities. The 1970 US Census does not identify the 
SMSAs where individuals live, only whether they live in a SMSA  or not. Individuals are 
instead assigned to so-called county groups. County groups can be related to SMSAs by using 
the so-called county group map (attached to the PUMS in 1970). We match individuals to 
SMSAs in the following way. When one or more county g roups are contained in one SMSA, 
we assign individuals located in one of the county groups to the SMSA that contains them. 
When a county group contained more than one SMSA, we merged the different SMSAs into one 
(13 of our 163 cities are obtained this way) applying the same criterion to SMSAs in 1980 and 
1990 (to ensure that cities are defined in the same way in 1970, 1980, and 1990). Finally, when 
a county group was contained partly in a SMSA and partly in a non-SMSA area, we assigned 
all individuals located in the county group who lived in a SMSA to the SMSA that contained 
part of the county group. This procedure resulted in 163 cities for 1970, 1980, and 1990. The 
code to perform the identification and merge of cities is available from us upon request. 
 
Definition of Individual Wages and Schooling 
Hourly wages in a given year have been calculated as yearly salary and wage divided by 
weeks worked times average hours per week worked in the year. All regressions are run using 
only individuals with positive hours worked and non-negative potential experience. All 
variables refer to the year previous to the census. Top-codes differ across years. Individual 
years of schooling have been obtained in the following way. For 1970 and 1980, we use the 
variables “Highest Grade Attended” and “Grade” which yields nineteen levels of schooling. 
For 1990, we use the variable “Yearsch” which yields eleven levels of schooling. When we 
only observe an interval for years of schooling, we use the midpoint of the interval as years of 
schooling in the Mincerian wage regressions in (29). The Variable “years of experience” used 
in (29) is potential experience, i.e. age minus years of schooling minus six. For the constant-
composition approach in (26) we partition years of schooling in six intervals [0-9), [9-12), 
[12-14), [14-16), [16-17), and [17 and more) and years of experience in five intervals  [0-10), 
[10-20), [20-30), [30-40), [40-more). 
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A.3   The Constant-Composition Approach to Human Capital Externalities at the 
Country level 
The constant-composition approach as developed so far cannot be applied to the identification 
of human capital externalities at the country level because it would be unreasonable to assume 
that all countries have access to a perfectly competitive international market for physical 
capital. This raises the question of how the strength of average human capital externalities can 
be estimated at the country level. To answer this question suppose that the production function 
at the country level is 
    (,,) YAFLHK =   (A1) 
where  K  is the physical capital stock used in production and the level of TFP is  ABh
q =  
where  B captures exogenous differences in TFP and q  the strength of average human capital 
externalities at the country level;  L,H  are defined as usual. Assume that the aggregate 
production function is twice continuously differentiable and subject to constant returns to scale 
to  L,H ,K  as well as constant or decreasing returns to human capital and to physical capital. 
Suppose also that labor markets and the market for physical capital at the country level are 
perfectly competitive and that firms maximize profits taking the level of TFP as given. Denote 
the rental price of physical capital at the country level by  r  and define “factor income per 
worker” by  (,)() wxhlxdxrk + ￿ , where  k  is the physical capital intensity. Then the following 
proposition holds. 
Proposition A1: The elasticity of factor income per worker with respect to the average level 
of human capital yields the strength of average human capital externalities when labor-force 
skill-composition weights  () lx and the physical capital intensity  k  are held constant 
  ( )













.  (A2) 
Proof: The argument is very similar to the proof of Proposition 2, which is why we will only 
sketch the main elements. Competitive factor markets at the country level, profit-maximization, 
and the aggregate production function imply that factor income per worker can be written  as 
123 (,)() wxhlxdxrkAFAFhAFk +=++ ￿ , where  i F  denotes the partial derivative of  (,,) FLHK 
with respect to the  i-th argument. Hence, (A2) follows if 
123122232 ()/0 FFhFkhFFhFk ¶++¶=++= . To demonstrate this last equality, notice that constant 
returns to scale to  L,H ,K  and twice continuous differentiability of the production function 
imply  212223 (1,,)(1,,)(1,,) FhkFhkhFhkk ++=   122232 (1,,)(1,,)(1,,)0 FhkFhkhFhkk ++= . Q.E.D. 
A.4  Effects of Labor Supply on Relative Wages 
Notice that equation (18) can be written as  2 ()(1,)(1,)() wxAFhAFhxh =+-  using constant 
returns to scale given TFP of (16). Hence,   38
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,  (A4) 
using  ()()
lh LLxLx ”+ and  (()())/
llhh hLxxLxxL ”+ . The increase in the relative wage of 
low human capital workers is therefore proportional to 
2
22(1,)()
hl Fhxx --  when the supply of 
low human capital workers decreases and the supply of high human capital workers increases 
by the same amount. 
A.5   Second-Order Effects of the Constant-Composition Approach 
Proposition  A2:  Suppose that the aggregate production function in (16) is three times 
continuously differentiable. Then the second-order effect of the log of average human capital on 





= ”-‡ , where  0 () hlxx = ￿ . The quadratic approximation of the 
relationship between the log-change of average wages holding labor-force skill-composition 
weights constant and the log-change of average human capital is therefore 
2
 () constant  log(,():0)(log)(log)
lxx whlxxhh qh
" D‡=D+D . 
Proof: The first-order effect is  120 log((1,)(1,))/log FhFhhh q +¶+¶  
( ) ( ) 12220120 (1,)(1,)/(1,)(1,) FhFhhhFhFhh q =+++  evaluated at  0 hh = . The second-order effect 
can be obtained by differentiating the expression above with respect to logh  and evaluating it 
at  0 hh = . Differentiation yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
122201201222220120 ((1,)(1,))/(1,)(1,)/(1,)(1,)/(1,)(1,) hFhFhhhFhFhhhFhFhhhFhFhh +¶+¶+++
. The first term evaluated at  0 hh =  is zero because constant returns to scale of the production 
function given TFP implies that  2(,) FLH  is homogenous of degree zero, which combined with 
twice continuous differentiability of the production function yields 
1222021220 (1,)(1,)(1,)(1,)0 FhFhhFhFhh +=+=  for  0 hh = . To simplify the second term notice that 
constant returns to scale given TFP also imply that  102000 (1,)(1,)(1,) FhFhhFh +=  and that 
22(,) FLH  is homogenous of degree minus one. The latter combined with three times continuous 
differentiability of the production function yields 
220221022200122022200 (1,)(1,)(1,)(1,)(1,) FhFhFhhFhFhh -=+=+ . Hence, the second term evaluated at 
0 hh =  becomes 
2
22000 (1,)()/(1,) FhhFh - .  Q.E.D.   39
A.6  Identifying Human Capital Externalities in the Katz and Murphy (1992) 
Framework 
It is straightforward to show that the constant-composition approach to the identification of 
human capital externalities carries over to the Katz and Murphy (1992) framework. To see this 
suppose following Katz and Murphy that total output  Yct in city  c at time  t is produced 
according to a constant returns to scale production function  (,) ctctctct YhFLH
q = , where  / hHL =  
and  H  and  L are related to the hours supplied by high school dropouts  1 N , high school 
graduates  2 N , college dropouts  3 N , and college graduates  4 N  through  134 HNbNN b ”++  and 
123 LNNaN a ”++ .14 Assume also that all markets are competitive and do not internalize the 
effect of human capital on output captured by  q  (q  measures the strength of human capital 
externalities). 
  It is straightforward to show that the supply of workers of different types affects the wage 
of type-i workers only through the average level of human capital h. Hence, the average wage 
in a city can be written as 
  (,:1,2,3,4)() iii
i
whniwhn =” ￿ .  (A5) 
where  () i wh is the wage of type-i  workers as a function of average human capital and 
/() iii nNN = ￿  their share in the labor force. The definition in (A5) allows us to state the main 
proposition. 
 
Proposition A3: The elasticity of the average wage with respect to the average level of human 
capital yields the strength  of average human capital externalities when labor-force skill-
composition weights  i n  are held constant,  ln(,:1,2,3,4)/ln i whnih q ¶=¶= . 











Øø ￿￿ ¶￿￿ Œœ ￿￿ ¶=¶ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ Łł Œœ ==+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ¶¶¶ Œœ ŁłŁłŁł Łł
Œœ ºß
￿￿￿ . 
Hence, the result follows if the term in square brackets is equal to zero, i.e. if the first-order 
effect of the average level of human capital on the average wage holding  labor-force skill-
composition weights  i n  are held constant is equal to zero when human capital externalities are 
absent. In competitive equilibrium, the wage of type-i workers is linked to the production 
function by 112 ()(1,)(1,) whhFhhFh
qq ab =+,  21 ()(1,) whhFh
q = ,  312 ()(1,)(1,) whahFhbhFh
qq =+, 
and  42 ()(1,) whhFh
q = . Making use of the relationship between wages and the production 
function and continuous differentiability of  (,) FLH , it can be shown that the term in square 
                                                               
14 Katz and Murphy (pp. 67-69) consider a framework with two labor inputs, high school equivalents 
and college equivalents. High school graduates are treated as pure high school equivalents and college 
graduates as pure college equivalents. High school and college dropouts are seen as combinations of high 
school graduates and college graduates. The weights are determined by regressing wages of high school 
(college) dropouts on the wages of high school graduates and college graduates. Our assumptions on 
production are necessary and sufficient to obtain the KM framework.   40
brackets is equal to ( ) 2122 (1,)(1,)/ i i LFhHFhN + ￿ . Constant returns to scale of  (,) FLH  imply 
2122 (1,)(1,)0 LFhHFh += .  Q.E.D. 
 
A.7  Human Capital Externalities Through Higher Moments 
We now consider the case where the whole distribution of human capital matters for 
productivity. This amounts to relaxing the (implicit) assumptions regarding  the pattern of 
substitutability among different levels of human capital in the human capital framework and 
allowing externalities to be driven by the whole distribution of human capital. 
  Assume that there are  { } 1,..., XQ ”  types of workers and that output  Y  is determined by the 
production function  ( ) (): YAFNxxX =˛ ,   where A denotes TFP,  () Nx denotes employment 
of workers with human capital  x . The only assumptions imposed on  the production function 
are weak concavity, twice continuously differentiability, and constant returns to scale. Suppose 
that externalities may be driven by the whole distribution of human capital 
(():\) AgnxxXq =˛ , where  ()()/()
x nxNxNx ” ￿  denotes the share of workers with human 
capital  x  and  q   is the reference level of human capital. This specification captures the 
external effect of workers with human capital  x through  ln(():\)/() gnxxXqnx ¶˛¶ , the 
percentage increase in TFP caused by a one percentage point increase in  () nx accompanied by 
a one percentage point decrease in  () nq, the share of workers with the reference l evel of 
human capital  q . The average wage can now be written as 







Łł ￿ ,  (A6) 
where the wage of workers with human capital  x  in the absence of 







˛”--+ ￿          (A7) 
under perfect competition (
() nx F  denotes the partial derivative of  ( ) (): FNxxX ˛  with respect 
to  () nx). 
 
Proposition A4: The elasticity of the average wage with respect to  () nx holding labor-force 
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￿
.   (A8) 



















.       (A9) 
Making use of (A7) the second term is equal to 









=˛-˛ ￿￿  
where the equality uses that  ( ) (): FNxxX ˛  is twice continuously differentiable (
()() nxnx F  
denotes the partial derivative of  ( ) () (): nx FNxxX ˛  with respect to  () nx). Constant returns to 




˛= ￿  for all  jX ˛ , which yields that the second 
term in (A9) is zero.   Q.E.D. 
 